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Abstract
At its core, contact tracing is a form of egocentric network analysis
(ENA). One of the biggest obstacles for ENA is informant accuracy
(i.e., amount of true contacts identified), which is even more
prominent for interaction-based network ties because they often
represent episodic relational events, rather than enduring relational
states. This research examines the effect of informant accuracy
on the spread of COVID-19 through an egocentric, agent-based
model. Overall when the average person transmits COVID-19 to 1.62
other people (i.e., the R0), they must be, on average, 75% accurate
with naming their contacts. In higher transmission contexts (i.e.,
transmitting to at least two other people), the results show that
multi-level tracing (i.e., contact tracing the contacts) is the only viable
strategy. Finally, sensitivity analysis shows that the effectiveness
of contact tracing is negatively impacted by the timing and overall
percent of asymptomatic cases. Overall, the results suggest that
if contact tracing is to be effective, it must be fast, accurate, and
accompanied by other interventions like mask-wearing to drive down
the average R0.

Keywords

Egocentric network analysis, Agent-based model, COVID-19,
Contagion.

Issues regarding the reliability and validity of relational
data have been a long concern for social network
researchers (Perry et al., 2018), especially when such
data are supposed to represent observable behavior
(i.e., A interacted with B this week). And although
there has been considerable research demonstrating
various biases and cognitive limitations participants
have when reporting their network ties (see, Smith
et al., 2020, for a review), less work has demonstrated
some of the more applied consequences of such
issues. In other words, in what applied contexts
should researchers take a deeper look at the out
comes of informant accuracy?
One such applicable area where the reliability and
validity of relational data are important is the practice
of contact tracing. Contact tracing is a strategy
used to help contain various infectious diseases that

© 2021 Authors. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons
Attribution 4.0 License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)

spread through interpersonal contact. Put simply,
contact tracing is the process of retrospectively
identifying persons who may have made interpersonal
contact with a confirmed infectious individual (Eames
and Keeling, 2003). The logic of contact tracing is
straightforward: identify contacts who have had
interactions with an infected patient and remove
them from the social system to (hopefully) prohibit
the further spread of the disease. Such a method
has been credited as effective because it allows for
the testing of at-risk contacts and this method also
allows for the identifying of hotspots and clusters of
diseases (Klinkenberg et al., 2006).
At its core, contact tracing is simply a form of
egocentric network analysis (ENA). ENA is the study
of individuals (i.e., egos) and people in the ego’s
immediate social environment (i.e., alters; Perry et al.,
25

Egocentric contact tracing for COVID-19: Pilny et al.

2018). Conducting a reliable and valid ENA study is
challenging, and there is a rich academic/applied
literature dedicated to improving the rigor behind
these efforts (Crossley et al., 2015; McCarty et al.,
2019; Perry et al., 2018). However, there has been
scant research determining how varying levels of
reliability and validity might influence how effective
contact tracing can be at containing infectious
diseases.
This research is organized as follows. First, we
review the literature behind contact tracing and our
key factor of interest: informant accuracy. Second, we
set up the details behind the egocentric agent-based
model, examining the effect of informant accuracy
and multi-level tracing on the spread of Severe
Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARSCoV-2), the biologic strain of coronavirus that causes
the illness known as COVID-19. Third, we conduct
a sensitivity analysis to examine the impact of the
timing of the tracing and the percent of asymptomatic
cases in the population. Finally, we discuss the results
in terms of the wider literature on contact tracing and
ENA.

A brief review of contact tracing
Contact tracing is a well-known type of social network
intervention for understanding how infectious diseases
spread (Valente, 2010). Indeed, rudimentary versions
were even used during waves of the bubonic plague
in the sixteenth century (Cohn and O’Brien, 2020).
Contact tracing has been employed in infectious
diseases caused by various pathogens (e.g., STIs,
Macke and Maher, 1999; SARS: Donnelly et al.,
2003; TB: Mandalakas et al., 2017). Consequently, it
is considered efficient at reducing the prevalence of
infections, especially when dealing with an isolated
number of cases (e.g., STIs) or toward novel forms of
viruses (Eames et al., 2010).
Although contact tracing is generally considered
a useful means of gathering potential transmission
data, it does not always suffice, by itself, as a control
measure to contain a given epidemic (Eames et al.,
2010). Moreover, the effectiveness of contact tracing
is dependent on the transmission dynamics of the
outbreak (Klinkenberg et al., 2006) and on the timing
of the tracing itself (Kretzschmar et al., 2020). For
example, Cheng et al. (2020) conducted a contact
tracing assessment toward COVID-19. They found
that, due to the high transmission rate before and
near an individual’s symptom onset, contact tracing
would be inadequate on its own. Instead, contact
tracing should be at least implemented with other
interventional strategies, such as social distancing
26

and mask-wearing. Likewise, a recent stochastic
transmission model by Hellewell et al. (2020) sought
to investigate the potential efficacy of contact tracing
and isolation of cases toward COVID-19. They did
so through a variety of simulated outbreaks and
ranging their R0’s and transmission before symptom
onset percentage. They found that contact tracing
probability (i.e., odds that the tracing happens) must
be high (i.e., 80%+) to control COVID-19 transmission.
Additionally, agent-based models (ABMs) have
been used to simulate contact tracing data. Kucharski
et al. (2020a, b) employed ABM to simulate a variety
of scenarios involving responses to COVID-19 (e.g.
no control measures, self-isolation away from the
household, quarantining, self-isolation in the house
hold). The authors found that a combined approach
of isolating symptomatic cases and contact tracing
the contacts of positive cases reduced the spread of
COVID-19 when compared to individually implementing
measures. Furthermore, the authors note that in
an instance where asymptomatic cases were high,
many contacts would need to be traced and tested
to consider transmission at a higher network level (i.e.,
transmission from secondhand contact).
At the end of the day, contact tracing is theo
retically useful for understanding contagion dynamics
and practically useful for mitigating the spread of
infectious diseases, Additionally, as Eames et al.
(2010) point out, collecting contact tracing data is not
an easy feat. It requires significant material resources
to compensate tracers and it requires informational
resources to train tracers to overcome some of
the many obstacles to collect reliable and valid
contact network data. Overcoming these obstacles
is important because the effectiveness of contact
tracing is only as good as the data collected.

Informant accuracy: how do people
remember their contacts?
Because contact tracing is a form of ENA, it is prone
to a host of issues regarding reliability and validity (for
a review, see Perry et al., 2018). For contact tracing,
perhaps the most sensitive issue for data collection
is informant accuracy, the difference between an
ego’s perceptions of their network and their actual
network (Bernard et al., 1984). When researchers
compare and contrast between perceived and actual
networks, these analyses are commonly known as
accuracy studies, perhaps most notably popularized
by Bernard, Kilworth, and Sailer, otherwise known
as the BKS studies (for a brief review, see Bernard
et al., 1981). The general theme of the BKS studies
is that individuals’ self-reports of their network
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behaviors do not align very well with their actual
behaviors. Moreover, the network structures of selfreported and actual behavioral networks differ from
one another as well (Quintane, 2012). Although selfreported data on perceived network contacts may
be useful as cognitive social structures in its pure
form (Krackhardt, 1987), for contact tracing, it is clear
that the minimization of the error between the two is
a central concern. Indeed, since accumulation of a
handful of accuracy studies, there has been debate,
research, and theoretical moves to try and figure out
why there is such a discrepancy between perceived
and actual contacts (e.g., Corman and Scott, 1994;
Pilny et al., 2017), how to mitigate some of these
biases in data collection (Kogovšek et al., 2002),
and how to account for informant (in) accuracy in
inferential network analyses (Butts, 2003).
Nevertheless, it is important to understand why
individuals have trouble recalling network ties in
the first place. For starters, humans do not store
information like network contacts in a vacuum, they
are primarily organized through cognitive schemas
that cluster information based on how ties are related
to one another (McCarty et al., 2019). For instance,
Brashears and Quintane (2015) found that alters
tend to be better remembered in terms of common
group membership (e.g., role relations like family,
work, neighbors) and ‘chunked’ structures like triads.
Moreover, contacts are better remembered if they
are repeated and represent long-term, consistent
interactions (Freeman et al., 1987). Likewise, contacts
that are not very popular themselves (e.g., less central)
are often difficult to remember than popular ones
(Marin, 2004). Perhaps more importantly for contact
tracing, individuals whom the ego feels less close and
interacts with less frequently are more prone to recall
issues (Brewer, 2000). The key implication here is that
there are certain network ties that are more likely to
be forgotten.
For extracting contact tracing data, all of the above
issues may be present, but may be even further
complicated by the fact that such data represents the
extraction of relational events, not relational states. A
relational event can be defined as a ‘discrete event
generated by a social actor and directed toward one
or more targets’ (Butts, 2008, p. 159), while relational
states can be viewed as ‘continuously persistent
relationships between nodes’ (Borgatti et al., 2013,
p. 3). The transmission of COVID-19 does not require
an established relational state between dyads, a
simple relational event will suffice.
The key difference is the nature of the tie: relational
events are episodic, while relational states are more
enduring. For instance, some psychological theories

of recall generally find that some information (e.g.,
interpersonal contacts) are better remembered if they
are encoded in a meaningful way. For instance, if a
relational event occurs with somebody where there
is no meaningful relational state (e.g., friendship,
work relationship) or other cue of information, such
an event may be more difficult to recall because
the episodic event may be harder to encode in an
elaborative (i.e., meaningful) fashion (e.g., Craik and
Lockhart, 1972). Relational events divorced from
relational states or other helpful memory schemas
like elevator conversations, interactions with waiters/
bartenders, fellow parent at the park, etc. might lend
themselves more prone to recall problems.
Moreover, individual-level differences can also
exacerbate similar informant accuracy problems. In
other words, it could be characteristics about the
ego, rather than the alter, that can influence informant
accuracy. A substantial amount of research has de
monstrated that factors like gender (Breashears et al.,
2016), age (Hsieh, 2014), mood (Hlebec and Ferligoj,
2001), and occupation (Marineau et al., 2018) can
influence network recall as well.
As such, previous ENA research has demonstrated
that informant accuracy problems exist and influ
enced by characteristics of both the ego and the
alter. Poised with this phenomenon, we consider how
informant accuracy impacts the spread of COVID-19
when contact tracing is implemented. Important
questions like ‘how accurate does the contact tracing
need to be to have any effect?’ and ‘at what point do
we start to see diminishing returns?’ can be answered
by analyzing the relationship between informant
accuracy and viral spread. Moreover, contact tracing
requires participants to engage in the unpleasant
task of going into quarantine. Here, there is also a
challenge to be economical and try to require as few
as people as possible to go under quarantine. As
such, we ask:
R1: What is the relationship between informant
accuracy during contact tracing and (a) the spread
of COVID-19 and (b) number of quarantines?

Multi-level tracing using snowball
sampling
In addition to the effect of informant accuracy, it is
important to ask if there are any probable and useful
alternative strategies for collecting contact tracing
data. Because contact tracing is a respondent-driven
technique, we consider how a snowball sample may
be a useful strategy for finding potential infectious
contacts (Johnson, 1990). In the context of social
27
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network research, Borgatti et al. (2013) defined
snowball sampling as the process of gathering
network data ‘on any qualifying actor with a tie to any
actor already selected, up to K waves or until quotas
or cost limits are reached’ (p. 34). Such a technique
has been used in other studies attempting to gain
access to at-risk populations. For instance, Kendall
et al. (2008) were able to get up to five waves of data
for an HIV at-risk population in Brazil.
In the context of COVID-19, a qualified actor is
someone who has tested positive for the virus.
When the actor is interviewed for contact tracing
data, the practitioner will elicit from the actor a set
of alters and will inform those alters to get tested
and quarantine. This traditional method can be
described as first-level contact tracing as it revolves
around making use of the first wave of data from
the initial infected individual. Second-level contact
tracing would simply repeat the process for the set
of initial alters, which is to say it would contact trace
the contacts. A practitioner would then elicit alters
from these contacts and require them to get tested
and quarantine for the time being, a strategy used in
the early stages of the COVID-19 outbreak in South
Korea (Schneider et al., 2020). Third-level contact
tracing would repeat the same process for the new
alters and so on.
One of the key advantages of snowball sampling
is accessing hidden and ‘hard to reach’ populations
(Browne, 2005), such as those individuals who are
spreading COVID-19 but may not yet know it. In this
sense, it allows researchers to work backward to
catch up on the viral diffusion process. As such, we
ask:
R2: What is the relationship between multi-level
tracing and (a) the spread of COVID-19 and (b) the
number of quarantines?
Finally, informant accuracy and multi-level tracing
may be interdependent on their effectiveness at
mitigating the spread of COVID-19. That is, while
they may have main effects by themselves, they
can be dependent in complex ways. For instance,
different levels tracing may have different thresholds
of informant accuracy to contain the spread. To our
knowledge, there is no empirical work analyzing
the relationship between informant accuracy and
different levels of tracing. As such, we ask our third
research question:
R3: How do informant accuracy and multilevel contact tracing interact to influence the (a)
the spread of COVID-19 and (b) the number of
quarantines?
28

Methods
An egocentric agent-based model
Agent-based models (ABMs) are constructed to
‘simulate simultaneously multiple agents, or actors,
who behave in ways to that impact one another’
(Larson, 2012, p. 84). They are particularly useful
for understanding how simple rules guiding agents’
behavior or other manipulations of input factors can
influence the emergence of complex social structures
(Corman, 1996). ABMs are very common in public
health and epidemiology, where the goal is usually
to create models to understand infectious disease
dynamics that can help inform policy and responses
to epidemics (e.g., Epstein, 2009).
An ‘egocentric’ ABM does not radically depart
from the basic mechanics of social simulation
because ABMs already typically focus on interactions
between agents. However, the current egocentric
approach puts special emphasis on the ENA portion
as factors that can be manipulated (i.e., informant
accuracy and level of tracing). In the current model,
egocentric interaction networks are collected during
each iteration (i.e., a day), allowing to user to inspect
any network-interaction history of any agent.
What follows is a description of the key building
blocks of the current ABM, which we call ConTrace (see
Fig. 1 for visualization). Following Hammond’s (2015)
suggestions for best practices of reporting ABMs,
we specify the following: Properties, Actions, Rules,
Time, and Environment (PARTE). Documenting the
details of any ABM can sometimes be overwhelming.
As such, what follows is an abbreviated summary.
More fine-grained details can be found in an online
appendix1, including additional robustness checks,
model verifications, and the ConTrace model in
NetLogo.

Basic overview
The developed ABM of infectious disease tracing and
quarantine is based on a slightly modified susceptibleexposed-infectious-removed (SEIR) model with an ex
pansion by adding the procedures of contact tracing
and quarantine. The SEIR model, an expansion of
SIR model, divided the population into four groups:
(i) susceptible, (ii) exposed, (iii) infectious, and (iv)
recovered. Individuals in a population could go through
all the four phases during an epidemic outbreak.

Anonymous link to Appendix: https://osf.io/493n7/?view_
only=dc6bbca1533f4341ad188e5fe08b32c1
1

CONNECTIONS

Figure 1: NetLogo interface of ConTrace.

Figure 2 illustrates the structure and flow of the
model. Ovals represent human agents and rhombuses
represent model decisions. A ‘susceptible’ contact
moves into ‘exposed’ when they have made contact
with somebody that has COVID-19. Exposed contacts
now have the ability to be traced when the previous
infectious agent becomes symptomatic, goes to the
doctor, and gets contact traced. The odds that the
exposed contact must go under quarantine will depend
on the level of informant accuracy. If the exposed
contact does not get traced, they remain in the system.
All the while and depending on the transmission and
asymptomatic rate, they may continue to spread
COVID-19 if infected, and undergo contact tracing
when symptoms develop (i.e., incubation period is
over).

Properties
Properties represent the mutable and immutable
attributes of agents in the system, which can also
be observable and unobservable to other agents.
In the present ABM, only one type of agent, people,
is used. However, the agents are classified into six
groups – (i) susceptible, (ii) non-infected contacts,
(iii) presymptomatic contacts, (iv) asymptomatic
contacts, (v) patients, and (vi) recovered – based on

four attributes (see Table 1). The classification is made
by considering both the traditional grouping in the
previous studies and current modeling functions. For
example, it is necessary to separate people who have
never been exposed to the disease and who have
been exposed but not infected. We regard the former
as ‘susceptible people’ and the latter as ‘non-infected
contacts’. They both remain susceptible to the
infectious disease but only the exposed contacts may
be traced and quarantined. We define the ‘contact’
state of the ‘patients’ and ‘recovered people’ as false
even though they were exposed to the disease. This
arbitrary state setting allows us to focus on tracing
and quarantining the contacts in the model. The
deaths of the disease do not have a category as they
disappear from the model.
The agents are created in the setup procedure
of the model. When setting up the model, a defined
number of agents are created and randomly
distributed in the simulation window. All of them are
susceptible people except one presymptomatic
individual. To help visualize the process, we color
code the susceptible people as green, the noninfected contacts as magenta, the presymptomatic
and asymptomatic individuals as yellow, the patients
as orange and dark red, and the recovered people
as blue (see Fig. 3). When an agent is isolated, i.e.,
29
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Figure 2: Conceptual flow chart of ConTrace.

a patient, or quarantined, i.e., a contact, its shape
changes from a person to a sheltered person.

assumes that agents are interacting with one another
in a way that allows for potential transmission of
COVID-19. For instance, John Hopkins University
defines contacts as sustained interaction within
six feet for at least 15 min (Gurley, 2020). Through
being mobile and interacting, agents can change
the properties of other agents to represent the viral
transmission. Consequentially, this has a change
on the environment because infected agents will
eventually remove themselves from the system and
quarantine, where they will either become immune
or die.

Actions
The catalog of behaviors that each agent performs
within the simulation is actions. There are three basic
actions that the agents take in the simulation. The first
is mobility, which refers to how agents move around
in the environments. Like previous SEIR simulations,
we assume agents move a certain distance in a
random direction. The second is interaction, which

Table 1. Six groups of agents.

Susceptible?

Contact?

Infected?

Symptom?

Susceptible

✓

X

X

X

Non-infected contacts

✓

✓

X

X

Presymptomatic and asymptomatic contacts

X

✓

✓

X

Patients

X

X

✓

✓

Recovered

X

X

X

X
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Figure 3: Properties of agents in ConTrace.

Contact network
The resulting contact network is fixed, meaning that
interactions do not follow a stochastic model for new
selection of ties as in the case of inferential network
models (e.g., a stochastic actor-oriented model):
the placement of the agents is random. However,
because the random placements of objects in a fixed
space tends to produce clusters in what is commonly
known as the clustering illusion (Gilovich, 1991,
pp. 19-20), what is emerges is a typical ‘small-world’
world network with an above-average clustering
coefficient. Users can also specify a ‘traveler’
percentage to manipulate the amount of agents that
travel to random portion of the space, unrestricted
by their current mobility settings. The purpose of this
function is to introduce potential super-spreaders that
travel more across the space to make more contacts
across clusters (i.e., brokering). Indeed, the current
default setting (mobility = 2 and travelers = 10%)
tended to produce a contact network that could not
reject the assumption that it comes from a powerlaw distribution (GOF = 0.049, p = 0.67) according to
Clauset et al. (2009) distribution comparisons.
In general, the lower the mobility settings, the
more clustered the contact network will be because
the agents are more restricted to their initial local
placements. Likewise, the higher the traveler settings,
the more centralized the network will be until that
value reaches 50%. That is, after 50%, the majority of

agents will have unrestricted mobility. For instance, if
set at 100%, a Bernoulli random contact network will
be extracted because 100% of the agents are placed
at random areas of the map after each interaction
(Table 2).

Rules
Rules are the heart of any ABM. They define ‘how
agents choose an action, update properties, and
interact with each other and their environment’
(Hammond, 2015, p. 176). Given we aim to investigate
the effect of contact tracing, we begin with the basic
SEIR rules followed by the inclusion of contact tracing
rules.
Basic SEIR rules Before articulating specific rules,
the following assumptions are made:
• We assume agents’ backgrounds, such as
age, gender, occupation, health history, etc.,
are uniform as these features should not determine whether they should be traced or quarantined.
• We assume agents’ mobilities are uniform to
simplify the model.
• We assume patients, when under quarantine,
are so well isolated that they do not infect other
people in this model.
31
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Table 2. Typical contact network from the simulation.

Distribution

Outliers

Nodes = 1000
Mean degree = 14.79
SD degree = 8.28
Skewness = 1.49
Kurtosis = 2.58
Clustering coef. = 0.20

Nodes = 1000
Mean degree = 14.91
SD degree = 3.92
Skewness = 0.15
Kurtosis = 0.14
Clustering coef. = 0.01

• We assume the recovered people are fully immune to the disease as we focus on the effect of
quarantine during one epidemic outbreak event.
The basic SEIR model rules are set as below in
each tick, which we interpret as a full day:
• All agents move a certain distance in a random
direction, unless a traveler percentage is set.
• Each presymptomatic or asymptomatic ego defines all susceptible people and unquarantined
non-infected alters within its infection radius as
its contacts (Fig. 4) and record these agents’ IDs
in its egocentric contact-history list. At a transmission rate, the presymptomatic ego infects
one of these contacts and records the infected
agent’s ID in its infection-history list.
• If the presymptomatic individuals pass the incubation period, they become patients and are
immediately isolated.
• If the patients pass the disease period, they either recover and become immune, or die at the
fatality rate.
• The asymptomatic individuals have no symptoms. Unless they are traced and quarantined,
they infect the susceptible people and non-infected contacts within their infection radius. They
become recovered and immune after 14 days.
The main rule differences between our models
and other SEIR models are that the presymptomatic
32

and asymptomatic individuals are the only agents
who infect others.
Contact tracing rules Since all presymptomatic
individuals have a constantly updated contact-history
and infection-history in this model, when they enter
the patient phase, we can trace all their contacts and
then quarantine part of or all the contacts. The tracing
rules in each day are set as below:

Figure 4: Visualization of an infection
radius as an indicator of an ego’s
contacts.

CONNECTIONS

• Identify the new patients and generate a full
contact list based on the contact-history of all
these new patients. The contacts in this list are
regarded as the 1st-level contact.
• Examine the ‘infected’ status of the 1st-level
contacts, if any presymptomatic or asymptomatic individuals are found, trace their contacts using their contact-history and generate
the next level contact list, regarded as the
2nd-level contacts. We found some contacts
could have been included in the 1st-level contact list, because a person may be counted as
the contact by more than one patient. If this
happens, we exclude the contacts who have
been included in the 1st-level contact list.
• Examine the ‘infected’ status of 2nd-level contacts, if any presymptomatic or asymptomatic
individuals are found, trace their contacts using
their contact-history and generate the 3rd-level contact list. Exclude the contacts who have
been included in the 2nd-level contact list.
• Repeat the above procedures until all contacts
are traced.
In the model, we can test the effect of quarantine
up to different contact levels. The quarantine rules are
specified below:

• Calculate the total number of contacts at a
certain level based on the particular contact
list.
• Use the total number and the defined quarantine rate to calculate the number of contacts to
be quarantined. If the number has a decimal,
round down the number.
• Randomly choose and quarantine the number
of contacts in the list.
When quarantining beyond 1st-level contacts,
we identify the presymptomatic and asymptomatic
individuals from the quarantined agents, trace their
contacts, calculate the number of contacts to be
quarantined in the same way as stated above, and
then quarantine that number of the contacts.

Time
Time refers to the unit of analysis representing a
passage of time. Operationally, it is usually represented
by terms such as ‘ticks’, ‘iterations’, or ‘rounds’. In the
current simulation, a ‘tick’, for interpretation, represents
a 24-hr day. Moving from day 1 to day 2, the model
is put into action. What happens on day 2 will have
implications for what happens on day 3 and so on.
For instance, if a contact is infected on day 33, the

Figure 5: Contact tracing and quarantine procedure flow.
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incubation period of the contact will be cumulated
when day 34 begins.

regarding the true R0 value of COVID-19 (Liu et al.,
2020a, b). As such, we report our testing results for
three situations.

Environment
Finally, the environment represents the geometric
space and the components in the background. The
current simulation is defined by (i) size of the space
(i.e., world resolution) and (ii) number of agents. In
other words, agents are moving and interacting with
one another in an open space, defined by how big it
is and how many other agents are also included.

Model verification
The developed model is verified in three ways. First,
we carefully go through the model procedures to
ensure the conceptual rules are properly translated
into the programming codes. Secondly, we compare
our data on susceptible, infected, and recovered
groups with the data from the classic epidemic models
and confirm that our model can produce a typical
epidemic data pattern for these people groups. Third,
we consult with experts in Public Health to ensure the
model elements and assumptions are appropriate.
Once the model is verified, we run a series of
one-factor-at-a-time (OFAT) tests (Ten Broeke et al.,
2016) to validate the model and calibrate the following
two emerging parameters: (i) number of contacts per
person and (ii) the basic reproduction number (R0)
of COVID-19. Additional details on these tests are
included in the Online Appendix2, the main goal is
to find settings by exploring reasonable values with
respect to the transmission rate, population size,
and world resolution that would reproduce typical
outcomes related to interaction contacts in the
social network analysis literature and R0 (i.e., average
number of people an infected person infects) in the
epidemiological literature.
After calibrating our model, we found that, when
the world resolution is 30 × 30 with a population size
of 1,000, an agent with an infection radius of 4 may
have 14 to 15 contacts, which somewhat reflects
the average contacts in the USA and European
countries reported by social network and tracing
studies (e.g., Del Valle et al., 2007; Mossong et al.,
2008; Rothwell, 2020). However, there is uncertainty

The online appendix also details a typical infection network, which closely mirrors a core-periphery infection
structure. The over-dispersion parameter (k) is 0.14, in line
with typical estimations of the k-value for COVID-19 (Endo,
2020).
2
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R0 manipulation
Based on a meta-analysis of COVID-19 R0 estimation
studies, Liu et al. (2020a, b) conclude that the bestguessed estimation seems to be a number between
two and three. Several studies seem to vary on the
lower and higher end of that range. For instance, a
number of studies have found estimated the typical
R0 to be somewhere near 2.20 (see Table 3). Thus, in
situation one, we proceed with settings that produce
an average R0 of 2.11. However, some studies have
estimated the R0 to be slightly higher at 2.50 (Imai et al.,
2020), 2.55 (Majumder and Mandl, 2020), and 2.68
(Wu et al., 2020). As such, we produce a second
situation that produces R0 values at an average of
2.56 and can interpret these settings as the higherend R0 context.
However, in these two contexts, it is assumed
that COVID-19 is spreading with little public health
interventions to slow down the spread. Given the
rise of measures like mask-wearing, we include
a third situation which assumes a similar type of
intervention. For instance, Li et al.’s (2020b) simulation
suggests that if about half the population is regularly
wearing masks, the R0 can drop to between 1.60
and 1.70. As such, we modified the transmission
rate to produce a third situation of an average R0 of
1.62 (see Table 3).

Manipulated input variables

Informant accuracy
To manipulate informant accuracy, we simply adjust
the ‘%-contacts-quarantined rate’. For instance,
when a presymptomatic patient (i.e., ego) finally feels
their symptoms and becomes sick, we assume they
get contact traced and their contacts (i.e., alters) are
told to immediately quarantine for 14 days. To add
heterogeneity to this manipulation, the set percentage
is the mean of a normal distribution (SD = 5%) and a
value is drawn from this distribution.
The user can also manipulate false positives. In
this case false positive mean that an agent being
contact traced names an agent not on their contact
list to go under quarantine. Because people tend to
error less with false positives (Bernard et al., 1982),
we set the rate to be drawn at a normal distribution
with a mean of 10% (SD = 5%). The online appendix
reports results ranging from 0 to 30%.
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Table 3. Three contexts of model testing and selected previous estimations.
Current model situations
Situation

Average R0

Context

S1

1.62

Public health intervention like mask-wearing

S2

2.11

R0 near lower end of best estimations, no public health intervention

S3

2.56

R0 near higher end of best estimations, no public health intervention

Previous R0 estimates
Citation

R0

Context

2.20

Li et al. (2020)

Wuhan; January 22, 2020

2.20

Riou and Althaus (2020)

China and overseas; January 18, 2020

2.24

Zhao et al. (2020)

China; January 10-14, 2020

2.28

Zhang et al. (2020)

Diamond Cruise Ship, February, 2020

2.35

Kucharski et al. (2020a)

Wuhan; January-February, 2020

2.50

Imai et al. (2020)

Wuhan, January 18, 2020

2.55

Majumder and Mandl (2020)

Wuhan, December 8, and January 26, 2020

2.68

Wu et al. (2020)

Wuhan; December 31-January, 28, 2020

2.90

Liu et al. (2020)

China and overseas; January 23, 2020

Multi-level tracing
To manipulate the level of contact tracing, we analyze
1st, 2nd, and 3rd-level waves of a snowball sample
for each ego that is infectious after their incubation
period. 1st-level tracing represents the traditional

baseline approach. Infectious egos are contact traced
and their alters are quarantined. In 2nd-level tracing,
the alters of initial set of alters are traced as well and
they are correspondingly quarantined. Finally, in the
3rd-level tracing, the alters from the second wave are
traced as well and then quarantined (see Fig. 6).

Figure 6: Levels of contact tracing.
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Outcome of interest: prevalence and
quarantines
There are a variety of outcomes researchers can
measure to gauge the severity of an epidemiological
outbreak (Rainwater-Lovett et al., 2016). For our
purposes, we are most interested in strategies for
containment that would prevent the need for herd
immunity. As such, prevalence, which is simply the
percentage of total infections in a population, is used
as the key outcome. There is no precise rule-ofthumb for a critical value of prevalence but obviously,
the lower, the better3.
However, low prevalence may come at the cost
of excess quarantine orders. To account for this,
we also look at the number of quarantines that
were administered because of the contact tracing.
This could roughly be interpreted as a measure of
efficiency because the ideal strategy would be to
have the lowest infection prevalence paired with the
least amount of quarantine orders. For instance,
if everybody just quarantined all the time, it would
prohibit the spread of the disease. However, in reallife, that would not be an ideal policy as excessive
quarantines would come at drastic social (e.g.,
isolation) and economic costs (e.g., halt in economic
output) (e.g., Elmer and Stadtfeld, 2020). Indeed, this
number can even go over 100% because somebody
can be quarantined more than once if they are listed
as a contact multiple times over the duration of the
simulation.

Analysis procedures
The model (ConTrace) is created using NetLogo 6.1.1
(Wilensky, 1999) and is available for download in the
online appendix. For informant accuracy, we run from
0 (i.e. basic SEIR model) to 100 percent informant
accuracy, increasing the value in increments of five

Fine et al. (2011), for example, define critical level of infection prevalence for herd immunity to develop (Hc) as a function of the R0 value of the infection:
3

Hc =

R0 - 1
R0

Based on this equation, the critical prevalence level (Hc)
for the average-context spread condition (R0 = 2.11) would
be 52.60%. Likewise, the crucial prevalence level for the
high-context spread condition (R0 = 2.56) would be 60.93%.
Finally, for the context assuming mask-wearing, we would
assume a critical level (R0 = 1.62) of 38.27%.
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(e.g., 0, 5, 10, etc.). For each value, the simulation is
run 30 times. Finally, we repeat the process for 1st,
2nd, and 3rd-level contact tracing and for when the
R0 values are 1.62, 2.11, and 2.56. This results in 5,400
simulations to answer R1, R2, and R3. The median
values of prevalence and number of quarantines are
the key outcomes of interest.

Results
The three situations (S1, S2, and S3) represent
estimates on the spread of COVID-19 using three
different R0 values. S1 represents the lowest spread
condition where the average R0 is 1.62. This R0
assumes that some sort of public health intervention
like mask-wearing is in place (Li et al., 2020a, b). On
the other hand, we manipulate two different R0 values
between two and three, the best range estimates
of the typical R0 of COVID-19 (Liu et al., 2020a, b).
In the lower-end situation (S2), the average R0 value
is 2.11. In the higher-end situation (S3), the average
R0 value is 2.56. The main effects of informant
accuracy are plotted in Figure 7 and the main effects
of contact tracing level are plotted in Figure 8. To
understand how these two factors interact, the threeway interaction (informant accuracy, level of contact
tracing, and situation) is plotted in Figure 9.

R1: Impact of informant accuracy
Because collecting egocentric data is challenging, R1
asked how informant accuracy would influence the
spread of COVID-19. Figure 7 plots the main effect
of informant accuracy across each situation. Two
key trends emerge. First, there seems to be a clear
linear trend: the higher the informant accuracy, the
less prevalent COVID-19 is and the less people have
to quarantine. Second, the steepness of the slope
depends on R0 in each situation. That is, the lower the
R0, the less the accurate the informant needs to be.
For instance, to get at under 10% prevalence,
when the R0 = 1.62, a patient only needs to be
45% accurate with their contacts. However, when
the R0 = 2.11, that patient needs to be at least 75%
accurate. Moreover, this context comes at a cost
of quarantining more people as well (near 40%).
When the R0 = 2.56, informant accuracy has less of
an impact. For instance, even with 100% informant
accuracy, about half will have to go under quarantine.

R2: Impact of contact tracing level
R2 asked what impact multi-level contact tracing
would have assuming a traditional snowball design.
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Figure 7: Main effect of informant accuracy.

To look at the main effect of level of contact tracing,
Figure 8 plots the average prevalence and quarantine
values across each of the three situations. The clear
theme that emerges is that are significant differences
in prevalence and quarantines between 1st and 2ndlevel tracing, but smaller different between 2nd and
3rd.
However, there is one caveat. There appears to be
only small differences in prevalence, but significant
differences in quarantines when comparing situations
where the R0 = 2.11 and where the R0 = 2.56. That is,
overall, the main effect of multi-level tracing appears
in the context of S1, when the R0 = 1.62.

R3: Interaction
Figure 9 plots the main results across the interaction
between informant accuracy and level of contact
tracing. Overall, this graph tells a much more

complete story. The three situations are separated by
color: blue lines represent 1st-level tracing, red lines
represent 2nd-level tracing, and green lines represent
3rd-level tracing. The two outcomes are distinguished
by line type: solid lines represent prevalence and
dashed lines represent quarantines. The Y-axis
represent percent of the population with respect
to these two outcomes. Quarantines can go over
100% because an agent can be quarantined more
than once (e.g., after their 14-day quarantine is over,
they can be traced again if they made contact with a
different infected agent). Finally, informant accuracy is
plotted on the X-axis.
To begin at answering R3, we will look at 1st level
contact tracing across each context and see how
prevalence and quarantines (Y-axis) differs across levels
of network accuracy (X-axis). Overall, the results are
contingent on the transmission dynamics of COVID-19.
When the R0 = 1.62, a key inflection point emerges at
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Figure 8: Main effect of level of contact tracing.

Figure 9: Interaction between informant accuracy and level of contact tracing.
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about 75% informant accuracy with prevalence at
under 5% with less than 20% of the population having
to go under quarantine. When the R0 = 2.11 and the
R0 = 2.56, there really exists no viable strategy for 1stlevel contact tracing. Even at 100% informant accuracy,
the outbreak is not contained as vast majority of agents
end up contracting COVID-19, even when most agents
have to go under quarantine at least once. In other
words, it is the worst of both worlds: heavy infection
rates and lots of quarantine mandates.
Overall, 2nd and 3rd-level tracing look striking
similar. For instance, when R0 = 1.62 for 2nd and
3rd-level tracing, the key inflection point seems to
drop to 45% informant accuracy to obtain levels
of prevalence under 5% with less than 20% of the
population having to go under quarantine. In other
words, patients only have to only be about half right
about their contacts if those contacts are traced
as well. When R0 = 2.11, similar critical informant
accuracy level rise to about 75% for both strategies.
However, when R0 = 2.56, 2nd-level tracing needs to
be about 90% accurate for any viable results, but
can dip to about 75% informant accuracy without
needing too many excessive quarantines (~20%) if
3rd-level tracing is used.

Summary of results
In light of these results, we see three general themes,
all revolving around a critical value of 75%, but in
different contexts:
1. Traditional 1st-level contract tracing is only really effective when other interventions are taking place like mask-wearing to drive down the
R0 near 1.62. In that case, patients need to be,
on average, 75% accurate in naming their contacts.
2. When the R0 is at the lower end of between two
and three (e.g., 2.11), 2nd-level tracing may be a
viable strategy. In this case, patients will have to
be, on average, 75% accurate in naming their
contacts.
3. If the R0 is at the higher end of between two
and three (e.g., 2.56), contact tracing alone
will not be effective at mitigating the spread of
COVID-19. The only viable strategy is 3rd-level
contact tracing in which respondents will still
need to be at least 75% accurate.

Sensitivity analysis
Sensitivity analysis is ‘a method that measures how the
impact of uncertainties of one or more input variables

can lead to uncertainties on the output variables’
(Pichery, 2014). Here, we explore how two input factors
not initially included in the original model might influence
prevalence rates: (i) timing of contact tracing and (ii)
asymptomatic cases. We view these as crucial factors
because, in real-world settings, it is unclear when
contact tracing is implemented because of fluctuations
in receiving back test results and because of resources
available to do the tracing. Likewise, it is unclear what
percentage of COVID-19 cases are asymptomatic,
meaning that asymptomatic individuals are highly
unlikely to quarantine. In these tests, we manipulate
the timing of the contact tracing and percent of
asymptomatic cases while keeping the ideal setting of
network accuracy at an average of 100% as a constant
to demonstrate general trends (see Fig. 10).
The results show that the impact of contact
tracing on the spread of COVID-19 is sensitive to both
the timing of contact tracing and the percentage of
symptomatic cases. When R0 = 1.62, there is more time
to spare at increases in prevalence only take shape
after the third day. However, this is still dependent on
the amount of the population that is asymptomatic.
Once the population is at least 50% asymptomatic, the
timing nor the method of tracing has little impact as the
majority of the population will become infected.
In 2nd-level tracing, the impact of timing and
the R0 can be significantly relaxed, but only if the
asymptomatic rate is not over 50%. For instance,
when R0 = 1.62, noticeable differences in prevalence
do not emerge until the fourth day. In higher R0
situations (e.g., 2.11), that begins to change to the
third day. Finally, in even higher R0 situations (e.g.,
2.56), contact tracing seems to be ineffective even if it
occurs on the same day.

Discussion
Because contact tracing is essentially a form of ENA,
the current research sought to investigate the impact
of contact tracing on the spread of COVID-19 through
an egocentric, agent-based model. After creating
a basic SEIR model of COVID-19 for three different
contexts, we manipulated two aspects of contact
tracing: (i) informant accuracy (i.e., how accurate the
contact tracing was in eliciting alters) and (ii) level of
tracing (i.e., the number of snowball waves used).
Finally, we did a post hoc sensitivity analysis to see
how the (i) timing of contact tracing and (ii) amount
of asymptomatic cases influenced the spread of
COVID-19 as well. Below, we will discuss the results
in line with research on informant accuracy, best
practices for collecting egocentric data collection,
and wider literature regarding contact tracing.
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Figure 10: Sensitivity analysis on the timing of contact tracing and asymptomatic percent.

General informant accuracy levels and
contact tracing
One general theme of the current results is that
higher levels of informant accuracy results in better
mitigation of COVID-19 and less quarantines. How
ever, how accurate are informants with respect to
their contacts? This question may be difficult to
answer because of all the different ways informant
accuracy is measured, especially in the seminal BKS
studies. For instance, Bernard et al. (1982) provide
15 different informant accuracy measures. In the
context of contact tracing and the current study, the
most relevant measures are omission errors, which
Bernard et al. (1982) label as T2: the number people
not recalled who were actually communicated with
(i.e., number of true positives). In their electronic
information exchange system (EIES) study of 57 users
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(i.e., students and scientists) of EIES, the average T2
percentage was 66%. In other words, the informant
accuracy rate in line with the current study would only
be 34%. Contrastingly, in a study of teletype workers
(Killworth and Bernard, 1976), informant accuracy was
at about 50%. For reasonable outcomes of COVID-19
prevalence, this would mean that there would need
to be mask-wearing and second-level tracing to be
effective.
However, some contextual variables give reason to
suspect that informants might be slightly better able
to remember their contacts during contact tracing.
Most notably, the BKS studies are often during longer
periods of time ranging from several weeks to months.
It can be extremely easy to forget who you may have
bumped into several months past. On the other hand,
contact tracing poses short-term, rather than longterm memory challenges. According to John Hopkins
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University, typical contact tracing only requires patients
to remember contacts from the past five to seven days,
the average incubation period (Gurley, 2020). In any
case, more research may be needed to gauge typical
baseline T2 values of informant accuracy for contacts
from the past several days.
Nevertheless, the current research has demon
strated that informant accuracy plays a big role
COVID-19 prevalence and the number of quarantines
issued. For instance, when the R0 = 1.62, a decrease
from 75 to 70% informant accuracy jumps from
under 5% to just over 40% and moves the number
of quarantines from just under 20% to an unfeasible
percentage of over 100%. As such, what are some
ways in which informant accuracy can be improved?
The next section discusses the current results in line
with these important efforts.

Strategies to improve informant accuracy:
moving from states to events
Improving informant accuracy for ENA has long been a
concern for social network researchers. For instance,
Hsieh (2014) formalized the retrieval cue approach for
ENA. This approach assumes that the ‘successful
recall of an event depends primarily on how well the
retrieval cues match the event’s representations in
one’s memory organization’ (p. 3). A retrieval cue is
any additional piece of information that helps an ego
remembers a past event. The retrieval cue approach
mirrors Tulving’s (1974) theory of cue-dependent
forgetting. This theory assumes that forgetting (i.e.,
the inability to recall something in the present that
could be recalled in the past) does not mean that the
memory is lost, but only temporarily inaccessible. In
Hsieh’s study, participants were randomly assigned
to a retrieval cue condition in which they were
instructed to look at their (i) cell phone contact list,
(ii) last 30 emails, and (iii) friend list on Facebook and
Twitter as retrieval cues. Hsieh’s results found that
this approach yielded more contacts than a baseline
approach.
However, although Hsieh’s (2014) recall aid might
be a good strategy for remembering relational states,
it may not be as useful for certain relational events.
For instance, it is unlikely that a random elevator
conversational contact would turn up in somebody’s
cell phone, social media, or e-mail. As such, are there
certain recall aids that may be better tailored for
recalling relational events, rather than states?
One possibility may be the context-based recall
aid designed by Bidart and Charbonneau (2011).
The context-based name generator begins by asking
individuals about social context cues in everyday life

(e.g., work activity, shopping, home life). Then, once
relevant contexts have been triggered, contact names
corresponding to those contexts are generated. As
Bidart and Charbonneau explain, the context-based
approach is motivated by field theory (Feld, 1981).
Field theory regards situated action (e.g., activity foci)
as a key unit of analysis. For instance, if certain activity
foci can be activated (e.g., transportation), more
nonchalant relational events might be better able to
be recalled. Indeed, Pilny and Huber (2021) tested
three different contact tracing aids and found that the
context-based instrument significantly elicited more
contacts and places visited. If informant accuracy
significantly influences the efficacy of contact tracing,
then more work is indeed needed to develop recall
aids more tailored toward relational events, rather
than relational states.
Second, the timing of contact tracing matters
greatly. The current results largely replicate the
models put forth by Kretzschmar et al. (2020),
who find significant delays in the effectiveness in
contact tracing even after one day. After three days,
contact tracing essentially has no effect unless in
contexts of mask-wearing. This is the case because
contact tracing is inherently dependent on not just
quarantining contacts, but when those contacts are
quarantined. If there is a significant delay, then it
simply allows those contacts to remain in the system
and further transmit COVID-19. In other words, the
damage has already been done.
For applied implications, the results of this study
strongly suggest that practitioners in charge of training
contact tracers spend time working with techniques to
improve informant accuracy. We suggest the following
techniques to help improve informant accuracy:
• Encouraging the use of contextual recall aids
(e.g., activating relevant foci that puts somewhat random interactions in context).
• Improving basic qualitative interview techniques (e.g., the use of probing questions, establishing rapport and trust).
• Implementing contact tracing first to reduce interviewee fatigue.
• Clearly establishing the definition of a contact
to reduce differential interpretation (e.g., interactions within six feet for at least 10 min).

Exploring the potential of multi-level
tracing
The results of the simulations found that multi-level
tracing was more effective at reducing the prevalence
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of COVID-19 than traditional single-level tracing. The
reasoning seems quite simple. Not only were more
contacts traced, but these contacts were not just
random; they were the contacts of the initial contacts.
That is, in second-level tracing, we contact traced the
contacts who are at much more risk of contracting
COVID-19 because they were in contact with someone
who made contact with an infectious person.
Moreover, multi-level contact tracing was less
sensitive to informant accuracy, timing, and percent of
asymptomatic cases. However, is multi-level contact
tracing practical in real-life? Though some countries
like South Korea have used versions of multi-level
tracing (Schneider et al., 2020), they require fast
implementation in order to be effective. For instance,
consider if the amount of average contacts is 14 in the
simulations. Not only does a tracer have to contact to
those 14 contacts to notify them to quarantine and
get tested, but the 14 contacts also need to be traced
as well. Then, the contacts of those 14 contacts need
to be notified to quarantine and get tested, resulting
in an additional 196 notifications (i.e., 142).
The growing needs for quicker contact tracing
have sparked interest in using advanced information
and communication technologies. For instance,
smartphones and their applications have been
utilized to trace contacts and inform individuals
if they have been near an infected individual with
Ebola (see Danquah et al., 2019). Contemporarily,
similar technology is in development by Apple and
Google to trace the spread of COVID-19 via a phone’s
Bluetooth (Greenberg, 2020), with other countries,
such as Singapore, distributing wearable dongles to
do so (Asher, 2020). While these novel approaches
are exciting, they are still fraught with complications
and privacy issues (Danquah et al., 2019). Indeed,
a recent survey done by Avira found that 71% of
Americans would not be willing to use a contact
tracing smartphone application.
Another approach to quickly administer contact
tracing may be to move the procedure from in-person
phone calls to electronic surveys. For instance,
there is a considerable amount of ENA research
using surveys to collect data on alters going back
to the General Social Survey (Burt, 1984). However,
there are still questions as to how reliable surveys
are compared to the more ‘gold-standard’ method
of personal interviews. Nevertheless, some recent
research may be beginning to make progress in this
vein.
For instance, Hogan et al. (2019) report on the
efficacy of Network Canvas, a digital egocentric
network data collection tool designed to help ease
the burden of collecting such egocentric data. In a
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similar vein, Hollstein et al. (2020) tested four different
egocentric tools that emphasized visualization. They
found that most participants preferred concentric
circles over funnel tools and free designs, even though
these instruments did not significantly influence
network size or composition (see also Eddens and
Fagan, 2018). For multi-level tracing, we recommend
that researchers continue to explore designing
electric instruments for egocentric networks, but
perhaps also pay more attention to completion
times and effort needed to complete the tracing. As
the current results show, multi-level tracing is more
robust against informant accuracy, so accuracy can
be sacrificed a bit if the instrument can be deployed
quickly and to many people. For instance, when the
R0 = 1.62, respondents only need to be about 50%
accurate in second-level tracing.

Limitations
There are several limitations worth noting. The most
obvious is that the contact network is largely ‘fixed’
and does not follow a stochastic selection process
that includes endogenous factors like closure/
centralization or exogenous tendencies like mixing
(e.g., attribute homophily). This is especially notable
because the social network structure underlying
any infectious disease is just as important as a
disease’s biological properties when determining
how contagious that disease is with metrics like the
R0 value (Hébert-Dufresne et al., 2020). This suggests
that the results of the current simulations cannot
be generalized beyond similar network structures
reported in Table 2. This is important because
different contexts, communities, and cities may
have varying structures of interpersonal contact. For
instance, de Anda-Jáuregui et al. (2020), using cell
phone data, report on the contact network of Mexico
City. And although their results show similar levels
of centralization and clustering, it was much more
fragmented (i.e., had lots of separate components).
Future work may consider how manipulating the
contact network structure may impact the spread of
COVID-19 and how contact tracing can be leveraged
with such general network selection tendencies (e.g.,
Prem et al., 2017).
Finally, beyond the dynamics of the contact
network, there are still unknowns related to the
dynamic spread of COVID-19. Various studies have
reported different R0, secondary transmission rates,
and growth rates related to COVID-19. Without
precise values on these transmission dynamics,
researchers are taking educated guesses as to how
COVID-19 spreads. Indeed, as the current results
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suggest, different transmission dynamics, such as
varying secondary transmission rates, are likely to
return different results.

Concluding remarks
By now, informant accuracy is a well-known and wellestablished issue regarding social egocentric network
data collection (Corman et al., 2021). Contact tracing
is a one applied technique of ENA where researchers
can move beyond merely demonstrating that informant
accuracy exists, but can begin to investigate the
consequences of varying levels of informant accuracy.
The current research shows that informant accuracy
is critical to controlling the diffusion of an infectious
disease. Overall, the results suggest that if contact
tracing is to be effective, it must be fast, accurate,
and accompanied by other interventions like maskwearing to drive down the average R0. Moreover, the
results show the promise of multi-level tracing because
it is more robust to lower levels of informant accuracy.
How researchers and practitioners can deploy fast
and accurate contact tracing instruments could be a
vital next step in helping control outbreaks of various
infectious diseases.
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